The emergency of mutual cooperation is studied in a spatially extended evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in which the players are located on the sites of cubic lattices for dimensions dϭ1, 2, and 3. Each player can choose one of the three following strategies: cooperation (C), defection ͑D͒ or ''tit for tat'' (T). During the evolutionary process the randomly chosen players adopt one of their neighboring strategies if the chosen neighbor has a higher payoff. Moreover, an external constraint imposes that the players always cooperate with probability p. The stationary state phase diagram is computed by both using generalized mean-field approximations and Monte Carlo simulations. Nonequilibrium second-order phase transitions associated with the extinction of one of the possible strategies are found and the corresponding critical exponents belong to the directed percolation universality class. It is shown that externally forcing the collaboration does not always produce the desired result.
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory has attracted a lot attention during the past years ͓1,2͔ in human sciences, political sciences, biology, and economics. In particular, the so-called evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game ͑PDG͒, which is a metaphor for the evolution of cooperation in populations of selfish individuals, has been minutely investigated ͓1-5͔. In the original form of the PDG, only uniform populations with given strategies were considered. However, it was realized ͓1,6͔ that new interesting phenomena can occur when the PDG was expanded in such a way that local contests in a d-dimensional space could take place ͑we shall use the abbreviation SPDG for such systems͒. It turns out that these spatially extended models are similar to the ones studied in nonequilibrium statistical physics. They may exhibit a cooperative behavior resulting in phase transitions in the stationary state. Accordingly, it is very fruitful to study SPDG-like models using the tools developed in the framework of nonequilibrium statistical physics.
In its simpler form, the PDG is a version of matrix games where the symmetric incomes of the two players depend on their simultaneous decisions, whether they wish to cooperate with the others or to defect. Each player wants to maximize his individual income. The highest individual payoff ͑the temptation to defect͒ can be reached by the defector against the cooperator receiving the lowest reward ͑sucker's payoff͒. The mutual cooperation results in the highest total payoff divided equally between the players. For mutual defections the players get a lower payoff exceeding the value of the sucker's payoff. Two rational players will both defect, because this choice provides the larger income independently of the partner's choice.
Conversely, mutual cooperation dominates in economic and biological systems where the contestants interact frequently. In the iterated round-robin PDG, the players, knowing the previous decisions, have to choose between two options ͑defection and cooperation͒. For a given round the contestants can be classified according to the total individual payoffs they have obtained. Following the Darwinian selection principle, at each round the worst player will adopt the winner's strategy.
Extended numerical simulations have been performed to select the ''best strategy'' among many ͓4,7͔. Best does not means that this strategy will always win a fight against another strategy, but means that it will obtain the highest payoff during a tournament during which it will have to fight against many opponents having different strategies. In Ref.
͓4͔ the highest payoff was obtained by the player using the so-called ''tit for tat'' ͑T͒ strategy, who cooperates in the first round and then always repeats his coplayer's previous decision. The main characteristics of this strategy ͑never defect first, react to the defection of the opponent, and forgive͒ are crucial ingredients to sustain mutual cooperation against the defectors. In particular, extensive simulations ͑see Ref.
͓3͔ for a summary͒ for the case in which the players adopt either strategy C ͑cooperate unconditionally͒ or D ͑defect unconditionally͒ have shown that the cooperators were disappearing in the stationary state. The introduction of some T strategies has an important effect. For short times, the D population increases while the C one decreases, leading to the decrease of D payoffs. As a consequence, T's can invade the D population.
In order to study the spatial effects, Nowak and May ͓6͔ introduced a SPDG consisting of a two-state cellular automaton. The players are located on a regular lattice in a d-dimensional space and can adopt the C or D strategy. Each player is fighting with the individuals belonging to a given neighborhood. The player's strategies are upgraded simultaneously in discrete time steps according to the following rule: each player adopts the best strategy found in his neighborhood. This model exhibits a rich variety of spatial and temporal patterns as a function of the payoff b, characterizing the temptation to defect. Other SPDG models have also been investigated ͓8-10͔. In particular, Killingback and Doebeli ͓11͔ showed that ''Pavlov'' like strategies can be even more efficient than ''tit for tat'' in some circumstances.
Nowak et al. ͓12͔ also extended the above analysis by allowing stochasticity ͑irrational choices͒ during the evolutionary process. The degree of stochasticity is governed by a parameter called m, and, in the limit m→ϱ, one recovers the deterministic case. According to the value of b, several stationary states are possible.
In some related models ͓13͔, Szabó and Töke showed that the different stationary state phases were separated by second order nonequilibrium phase transitions lines. The associated critical exponents belongs to the directed percolation ͑DP͒ universality class ͓13,14͔.
Both the importance of the presence of T's in the PDG and the richness associated with the spatially extended aspect motivated us to study a new class of SPDG. In the present work, we study an aspect of the SPDG, namely, what is happening when the cooperation is enforced by some external constraints. More explicitly, we consider a SPDG with the three strategies D, C, and T, and investigate the effects of random adoption ͑or forcing͒ of C strategies. This effect can be interpreted as an attempt by a government or by any other organization to enforce cooperation among individuals by forcing some of them, chosen randomly with a given probability p, to cooperate. A different interpretation can also be given. Among the players' community, some old players resign and are replaced by younger ones having a different educational background, making them more open to collaborate. As we shall see, the effects of this external constraint are rather surprising. Indeed, in dimensions 1, 2, or 3, the presence of the constraint reduces the cooperation if p is less than a given threshold value p c depending upon the dimensionality of the system. The cooperation is enforced only if the constraint is strong enough, i.e. if pϾ p c . The nonequilibrium second order phase transitions describing the extinction of one of the possible strategies are found to belong to the directed percolation universality class.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is defined in Sec. II. Its properties are analyzed in the mean-field approximation in Sec. III. The properties of the model without constraint are discussed in Sec. IV. The model with constraint is studied in Sec. V, both in the mean-field approximation and by Monte Carlo ͑MC͒ simulations, for one, two, and three dimensions, respectively. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Sec. VI.
II. MODEL
We consider a SPDG model in which the players are located on the sites of a d-dimensional cubic lattice of linear size L where periodic boundary conditions are assumed. Each player adopts one of the three strategies D ͑defection͒, C ͑cooperation͒ or T ͑tit for tat͒, and interacts with its 2d nearest neighbors. The total payoff of a given player is the sum of the payoffs coming from the interaction with all its nearest neighbors. We use an extension ͑including the tit for tat strategy͒ of the payoff matrix used by Nowak and May ͓6͔. The individual payoffs for the players P 1 and P 2 as a function of their strategies are given in Table I . The only free parameter b (1ϽbϽ2) measures the temptation to defect. Note that the above payoff matrix does not take into account that T players always try to cooperate with D's during the first round. Thus these values are considered as the averaged ͑or in this present case stabilized͒ payoffs.
It is legitimate to use this payoff matrix, providing that the strategy adoption is rare comparing to the frequency of the game. It makes the simulation simpler and more efficient. Note that similar payoff matrices can be obtained when substituting some other ''nice'' strategy ͑like Pavlov's, which cooperates in the first round: a strategy which is nevertheless less efficient than T in this case͒ ͓3,4͔ for T.
For the nonconstrained case (pϭ0), the system evolves in discrete time according to the following MC process. Starting from a random initial state, a site is chosen randomly. This site updates its strategy by first randomly selecting one of its nearest neighbors and, second, by adopting the strategy of this nearest neighbor only if it has a higher payoff. A MC steps consists of updating each lattice site once, on the average.
In the constrained case, at each time step, each player is forced to adopt a cooperative strategy C with a probability p. Thus the dynamics of the constrained model is the following. ͑i͒ One chooses randomly one player. ͑ii͒ With probability p, this player adopts the C strategy. ͑iii͒ With probability 1 Ϫ p, the player searches for a better strategy according to the procedure described above. ͑iv͒ The players update their payoffs. The model is characterized by three free parameters: b, p, and d.
It is hopeless to find exact analytical solutions for such models. Accordingly, we shall first study them in the framework of mean-field-like approximations, and then investigate them by numerical simulations.
III. MEAN-FIELD-LIKE APPROXIMATIONS
The simplest mean-field approximation consists of neglecting all the spatial correlations in the systems. This amounts to considering a model in which, for each player, the partners are chosen randomly in the system instead of being restricted to a particular neighborhood. Each player interacts with the same number of counterparts. The dimensionality of the system plays no role. The simplest meanfield-like approximations have previously been successfully used for similar problems, and more details concerning this approximate scheme can be found in textbooks ͓1,2,5͔.
Within this approximation, the dynamics of the system is completely described by the time-dependent concentrations
where N ␣ (t) is the number of players with strategy ␣ at time t. These concentrations satisfy the normalization condition c D ϩc C ϩc T ϭ1. According to Table I , the average payoffs for each strategy are
͑2͒ 
Note that the C and T strategies have the same payoffs; therefore, no strategy exchange will occur among them. Following the evolutionary rules given in Sec. II, the concentrations c ␣ (t) obey the equations of motion
where the upper and lower signs refer to the cases when strategy D is dominated by C and 
while for pϾ1/2 the system goes to the adsorbing state (c C ϭ1 and c D ϭc T ϭ0). Surprising the T strategy does not hold if pϾ0. Without constraints, i.e. for pϭ0, the system tends either to a homogeneous D adsorbing state (c D ϭ1) or to a mixed state of C and T strategies (c D ϭ0) depending on the initial conditions. Note that the above stationary states are independent of the value of b. Strikingly different behaviors will be observed beyond this simplest mean-field approximation when the local fluctuations and short-range correlations are taken into account, as we shall see in the following sections.
More elaborate mean-field-like approximations can be devised. The basic idea is to take some of the spatial correlations explicitly into account by computing the probability of the appearance of all possible configurations of a small cluster containing n sites. In one dimension, one considers a cluster of n consecutive lattice sites. The equations of motion for these probabilities follows from the evolution rules of the system. Details concerning the one-dimensional case were given in Ref. ͓15͔ . Note that already the one site mean-field approximation (nϭ1) differs from the simple mean-field solution given above. In higher dimensions pair or square mean-field-like approximations have been used, and a detailed description of these methods can be found in Refs. ͓13,16͔. Note that now, the predictions of these approximations depend upon the dimension of the system. Accordingly, the cases dϭ1, 2, and 3 will be discussed in different subsections.
IV. MODEL WITHOUT EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT
Let us start by considering the case with no external constraint, i.e., pϭ0. In this case, the dynamic is simple: a given player adopts the strategy of one of his randomly chosen neighbor, providing that this neighbor has a higher payoff. As we shall see, the only stationary states are either always trivial cooperator like (C or C-T) or a pure defector one (D). When the random initial state is made of only cooperators and defectors, one finds that, in dϭ1, 2, and 3 dimensions, the stationary state of the system is a pure defector one.
The reason for dϭ1 is simply that a D player has always a higher payoff than a neighboring C player. In dϭ2 several configurations should be analyzed. The most favorable situation for C to win is when it is adjacent to a flat C-D interface. However, if this interface has an irregularity, then D's can invade the sea of C players. Indeed, a newborn C in the D half-plane is always weaker than the D's at the interface and, thus, such C's disappears sooner or later. However, at a given time and with some finite probability, two next nearest neighbor C players could be present in the D half-plane. This results in a payoff of 3b for a D player squeezed between three C's and this D can now invade the C's and sweep off one layer of them independently of the value of b.
The dϭ3 case is very similar, but the process is slower. Indeed, four nearest neighbors of a D player ͑called D 1 ) must be invaded by C's if the value of b is close to 1. Once this has occurred, D 1 is strong enough to cross the interface and destroy all the C's.
For a large system with initially a finite proportion of T players, the stationary state is always a cooperatorlike state (T-C). This asymptotic behavior can be easily understood in the one-dimensional case. Let us suppose that there are four neighboring T's (TTTT) in the initial state of a onedimensional system ͑this is practically always the case in a sufficiently large system with a finite probability to have some T's in the initial state͒; then they kill all of the D's. Even in the worst case two D's could invade the T popula- tion, (CDDTTDDC), but then the central T's become stronger the ͑payoff is equal to1͒ than the D's ͑the payoff is 0͒. The D's kill all of the neighboring C's, and even these two T's can invade the whole D area.
This argument can be extended to d dimensions. A cube of linear size 4, made of T players, is enough to guarantee cooperation in the stationary state. The reason for this is that the D's surrounding this cube cannot destroy the central T players inside a cube of linear size 2. Indeed, the central T's have always d T neighbors to cooperate with ͑payoff d), but the neighboring D's can only have one C neighbor ͑the payoff is less than or equal to bϽd if dу2).
V. MODEL WITH EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT
We now consider the case in which the players are located on the sites of a d-dimensional cubic lattice in the presence of an external constraint, imposing on each player the need to choose the C strategy with probability p. The cases dϭ1, 2, and 3 will be considered.
A. One-dimensional system
In the one-dimensional model the players located on the sites of a chain interact with their two nearest neighbors. It is easy to see that the dynamics is independent of the value of the parameter b in its domain of definition.
A systematic MC analysis of the stationary states was performed by varying the value of p for different system sizes between Lϭ32 and 16384. Our simulations show that the T's strategy does not hold for all values of p. However, as a function of p, the stationary state can be either a symbiosis of C and D strategies or a pure C state, as shown in Fig. 2 . For very small values of p, one has a pure C stationary state (c C ϭ1); however, when p reaches the value p 1 , a first transition occurs to a stationary state in which the two strategies D and C coexist. At pϭp c2 Ͼp 1 the system undergoes a second continuous transition from the C-D stationary state to the pure absorbing C state.
The transition at p c2 is easy to understand. In one dimension and when only C and D strategies are present, our model is equivalent to the contact process ͑CP͒ which was originally introduced as a simple model for epidemics ͓17͔. In the CP a particle ͑sick person͒ can disappear at rate 1, and an empty site ͑healthy person͒ can become occupied with a rate z/2, where is the control parameter and z is the number of particles in the neighborhood of the empty site. In our model the D strategy, which in dϭ1 is always better than the C one, plays the role of the sick persons and the C strategy, which can only be created in the system through the constraint, corresponds to the healthy individuals.
Starting from a C-D-T initial state, after the extinction of all T's the possible stationary states are a pure C state or a C-D state. The C-D state corresponds to the steady state of the CP as well. For p around p c2 , the T's disappear rapidly, and thus do not affect the extinction of the D's. Hence the second transition to the absorbing state corresponds to the CP one. This transition occurs at p c2 ϭ1/(1ϩ c )ϭ0.23267 ͓18͔, and is believed to belong to the DP universality class ͓19,20͔.
The behavior of the first transition at small p's is much less clear. It turns out that for our model two characteristic parameters p ␣ (L) and p ␤ (L), depending on the system size L, can be introduced. For pϽ p ␣ (L) the stationary state is always the pure C state, while for pϾ p ␤ (L) the system evolves to a C-D coexistence phase, which is a steady state of the CP. For p 1 (L)ϽpϽ p 2 (L), the system can evolve toward one of the two possible stationary states, depending on the particular realization of the random numbers and on the initial state.
The probability L (p) of reaching the C-D state has been investigated numerically. The data are plotted in Fig. 3 , and can be well fitted by a function of the type 1Ϫexp"Ϫc 1 (p Ϫp 0 ) . This shows that ϱ (p) do not collapse to zero; hence the phase transition takes place at a finite value of pӍ0.025.
The respective times t C and t CD needed to reach the pure C and C-D stationary states have also been investigated. Both times show a singular behavior ͑see Fig. 5͒ . Unfortunately, we were not able to find a reasonable scaling fit for those data. However, it is obvious from the simulations, that t CD exhibits a much stronger singularity than t C . Hence, for a large system, the time needed to reach the C-D state is much larger than the one needed to reach the C state, even if the system evolves to the C-D state more frequently.
In addition to the MC simulations, the properties of the system were also investigated using generalized mean-field approximations. Assuming the coexistence of all the three strategies, these calculations can be performed numerically on clusters of sizes as large as nϭ4. Contrary to the MC results ͑see Fig. 2͒ , these approximations predicted the existence of a C-D-T state at small p values. As far as the T's are concerned, we observed that the maximum value of c T decreases when the cluster sizes n increase, providing a trend for the extinction of the T's. The contradiction between the present mean-field and MC results refers to the importance of ͑interfacial͒ invasion phenomena detailed below.
Allowing only two strategies (C and D), the above meanfield analysis can be performed for larger cluster sizes up to nϭ7. The results are compared with the MC ones in Fig. 2 . As expected, the accuracy of the generalized mean-field method increases with the cluster size n. The extrapolation of the results obtained for finite values of n (nϭ1, . . . ,7) leads to a critical value p c2 (MF) Ӎ0.235. The quality of this approximate scheme can be estimated by comparing the value of p c2 (MF) with the best known numerical value p c2 ϭ0.23267 ͓18͔.
In order to understand the behavior of the model around the first transition, it is interesting to examine the time evolution of the system in its transient regime. As illustrated in Fig. 6 , one can observe a domain growth process controlled by cyclic invasions ͓21͔. This picture suggests that the most relevant aspect of the dynamics is the collision between the fronts separating different strategies.
Let us first investigate the motion of a front separating a cluster of C's from a cluster of D's. The D domains contain some C sites coming from the external constraint. However, the lifetimes of the C's are very short ͓ϳ(1Ϫ p)͔. Within a D domain the average C concentration is equal to that of the CP, and can be well approximated by the simple mean-field approach, as we have seen above. The D strategy invades the territory of the C one ͑absorbing state͒. Due to the reflection symmetry the invasion front can move to the left or to right with the same absolute value of the velocity. To first order in p in the limit p→0, the absolute value of the average invasion velocity can be estimated by using the configuration probabilities given for nϭ1. This calculation yields vϭ 1Ϫ3p 2 . ͑5͒
Let us now consider the invasion of the T strategy into the D one. Inside a territory which has been invaded by the T strategy, the C strategy is set up with a probability p. As both C's and T's have the same payoff, no adaptation of strategies occurs between them. Assuming that this invading front travels with a constant velocity u, the probability of having a C player at a site k steps behind the front is 1Ϫe Ϫp(k) . (k) ϭ(kϩ1/2)/u is the averaged time it takes to the front to move over a distance of k. Thus, it follows that, to leading order in p, uϭ 1Ϫ11p 2 . ͑6͒
We note that the above approximations lead to a velocity for the D→C front which is larger than the one for the T→D front. This prediction can be compared with the results of the MC simulations ͑see Fig. 7͒ . For the D→C front, the agree- ment is very good if pϽ0.1, while, for the T→D case, the approximation reproduces well only the linear part near the origin.
Another consequence of the external constraint concerns the lifetime of the T clusters. According to the above picture, the probability that a T cluster dies out during the time evolution can be approximated by
The inverse of P T can be interpreted as the average lifetime T of an invading T cluster. Substituting an integral for the infinite sum appearing in the logarithm of the above expression leads to
This expression shows a fast increase of the lifetime when p decreases. For example, a T cluster dies out in about 10 5 MC steps ͑MCS͒ if pϭ0.04. This estimated lifetime is significantly larger than those found by MC simulations ͓ T (MC) (p ϭ0.04)Ϸ800 MCS͔, as indicated in Fig. 6 . The p dependence of the MC data can be well approximated by the function T ϭ3.26exp(0.226/p) within the region 0.025Ͻp Ͻ0.08 we were able to study. The large discrepancy between the mean-field and MC results refers to the enhanced role of the velocity fluctuations.
Starting from a random initial state, spatially separated domains are rapidly formed. Then two different situations can occur. First, T clusters are present on both ends of each D clusters, leading to a fast extinction of D's. Accordingly, the system evolves to a pure C state. Second, after some time the system reaches a state characterized by the presence of only one D cluster, having a T island at only one of its ends, in a sea of C's. As the D→C invasion is faster than the T →D, the T's can never destroy the D's and, due to the finite lifetime of the T cluster, the stationary state is a C-D coexisting one. The exponential increase of the lifetime of this T cluster as p→0 explains the singular behavior observed in t CD .
For pϽ p 1 (L), the lifetimes of the T players are so long that all the D clusters are surrounded by T's. Accordingly, the first scenario described above is always present, leading to a pure C state. Conversely, for pϾp 2 (L) the short lifetime of the T's insures that they disappear rapidly, allowing for the growth of the D clusters. As a consequence the stationary state is a C-D one.
B. Two-dimensional system
The players are located on the sites of a two-dimensional square lattice. According to the payoff matrix ͑see Table I͒ , two ranges of values of b have now to be distinguished, namely, 1ϽbϽ3/2 and 3/2ϽbϽ2. For any value of b in one of those ranges, the dynamics is the same.
Let us first consider the simulations performed for the value 3/2ϽbϽ2. The situation is summarized in Fig. 8 , in which the stationary values of the strategy concentrations are plotted as a function of p. For pϽp c1
(MC) ϭ0.1329(1), the system reaches a stationary state in which the three strategies C,D, and T coexist. Here it is worth mentioning, that for small p values (pՇ0.03), the finite system can reach the absorbing state if the initial state is chosen randomly. Below this size-dependent threshold value, the three-strategy state can be formed and sustained by a slow decreasing of p during the simulation. In this case the extinction of T's and D's is a consequence of fluctuations ͑detailed below͒, and the coexistence of the three strategies is considered as the real stationary state in the limit L→ϱ. The simulations performed for pу0.005 show that c D decreases linearly with p when p→0.
When p c1 (MC) Ͻ pϽp c2 (MC) ϭ0.3671(1), only strategies C and D survive. Finally, when pϾ p c2 MC the system reaches a pure C absorbing state.
The phase diagram obtained by numerical simulations can be compared with the ones obtained using the extended mean-field approximation described in Sec. III. At the level of the pair approximation, one finds p c1 (pair) ϭ0.1704 and p c2
(pair) ϭ0.4236, while for the square mean-field approximation one finds p c1 (sq) ϭ0.1482 and p c2 (sq) ϭ0.3980. These latest results are plotted in Fig. 8 . They compare well with the MC values given above.
Some complementary information can be obtained by studying the concentration fluctuations defined as
͑9͒
When p→0, the concentration fluctuations C and T diverge, while D remains regular, as shown in Fig. 9 . However, the sizes of the systems investigated were not large enough to conclude that C and T diverge as power laws of p in the limit p→0.
Moreover, the simulations suggest that for the stationary state in which the three strategies coexist, the typical size of T domains ͑as well as their persistence time͒ is proportional to 1/p. A similar behavior was found in the forest fire models ͓22͔ introduced by Bak et al. ͓23͔ to study the self-organized criticality.
The points p c1 and p c2 are critical points where a second order nonequilibrium phase transition takes place. Indeed, the T concentration vanishes at p c1 as c T ϳ(p c1 Ϫp) ␤ 1 , while the D concentration vanishes at p c2 as c D ϳ(p c2 Ϫp) ␤ 2 . In order to justify this behavior a very careful numerical analysis was performed, using longer sampling times in the vicin- ity of critical points. Fitting the numerical data leads to the above mentioned values of the critical points and ␤ 1 ϭ␤ 2 ϭ0.57(3), which is compatible with the directed percolation exponent as expected on general grounds ͓20͔. This fact is confirmed by the study of concentration fluctuations defined by Eq. ͑9͒. Sharp increases of the concentration fluctuations are expected at second order phase transitions. Figure 9 illustrates this point. The concentration fluctuations of C, D, and T strategies behave, near the transition point p c1 , as ϳ(p c1 Ϫp) Ϫ␥ 1 , with ␥ 1 ϭ0.37(6). A similar behavior was found at the transition point p c2 , with an exponent ␥ 2 ϭ0.37(9). These values are very close to the one of directed percolation: ␥ DP Ϸ0.35 in two dimensions ͓20͔.
The above data suggest that pϭ0 is another critical point. However, for the reasons explained above, it was not possible to extract reliable exponents.
It is interesting to analyze how the three strategies coexist for small values of p. As an example, let us consider the snapshot of the stationary state of a system with pϭ0.04 ͑see Fig. 10͒ .
One can observe that ''dark areas'' ͑made of defectors͒ invade the territory ͑''white areas''͒ of cooperators; simultaneously, the ''dark areas'' are invaded by the T actors ͑open squares͒. However, the domination of the T's is prevented by the external constraint, which leads to the growth of C areas within the T territory. When p decreases, the T territory expands, while the growth of white areas slows down. The dark islands become sparse. Conversely, an increase of the value of p accelerates the spreading of the C areas as well as their occupation by the defectors. Consequently, the D population increases with p, and the number of T competitors decreases and vanishes at pϭ p c1 .
As a result of these cyclic dominant processes, a selforganized domain structure is maintained in the system. Analogous spatiotemporal structures were already observed by Satulovsky and Tomé in a two-dimensional predator-prey system ͓16͔, and by Tainaka and Itoh when studying competing species ͓24͔. Both models belong to the family of spatially extended Lotka-Volterra models, predicting an oscillatory behavior of concentrations in the simple mean-field approximation ͓25͔.
One can also analyze the evolution of the typical strategy configurations in the vicinity of the phase transition taking place at (pϭp c1 ). One recognizes isolated colonies of T strategies whose motions remind us of the branching annihilating random walk models. It is known that this model also belongs to the DP universality class ͓26͔.
The rate of mutual cooperation is related to the average payoff per site. The maximum average payoff ͑whose value is 4͒ is reached when all the players cooperate with their neighbors. On the other hand, the minimum average payoff per sites coincides with the maximum of D concentration.
In Fig. 11 the average payoff per site is compared with the quantity 4(c C ϩc T ). One can see that the agreement between these two quantities is generally reasonable, and is even quite good for pϽp c1 . The differences between the two quantities only come from the fights taking place at the boundaries D-C or D-T. However, for this range of values of p, the D players form clusters due to the presence of the T's; accordingly these fights are not frequent.
Finally, let us briefly consider the case for which the parameter b belongs to the second possible range: 1ϽbϽ3/2. The results of the simulations are qualitatively similar to the case 3/2ϽbϽ2. The critical values of p are lower, namely, p c1 ϭ0.112(1) and p c2 ϭ0.297(1). The most relevant differences can be observed in the limit p→0, where the maximum concentration of the T strategy is strikingly lower (c T Ͻ0.15) than that reported in the previous case ͑see Fig. 8͒ .
C. Three-dimensional system
We now consider the case in which the players are located on the sites of a three-dimensional cubic lattice. According to the payoff matrix ͑see (MC) ϭ0.1512(2) and p c2 (MC) ϭ0.4130(3). As expected, the vanishing concentrations behave near the critical points as a power law, and both transitions belong to the directed percolation universality class. For bϭ1.6, the numerical analysis of the MC data in the vicinity of the second transition gives p c2 (MC) ϭ0.4165(2) and ␤ 2 ϭ0.79(4), in good agreement with the corresponding directed percolation value of ␤ϭ0.81(2) ͓27͔ .
The analysis of the concentration fluctuations T and D in the vicinity of the points pϭ p c1 and pϭp c2 leads to the critical exponent ␥ϭ0.18(8). The large uncertainty is due to the small extension of the critical regime ͑typically ͉pϪ p c ͉ р10 Ϫ3 ). The above value of ␥ is compatible with the scaling law for the DP exponents.
As far as mean-field-like approximations are concerned, they are supposed to be better when increasing the number of nearest neighbors ͑dimensions͒. The algebra soon becomes very cumbersome; therefore our analysis is restricted to the pair approximation. The results are given in Fig. 12 . One can see that the approximate results are in good agreement with the MC data, but in the close vicinity of the critical points. Note finally that the p dependence of the average payoff is qualitatively similar to that found for the two-dimensional model ͑see Fig. 11͒ .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have quantitatively studied the emergence of cooperation in a spatially extended version of the prisoner's dilemma game, with three possible strategies ͑cooperation, defection, and tit for tat͒ in the absence and presence of externally enforced cooperation. The players are distributed on a d-dimensional simple cubic lattice, and their interactions are restricted to nearest neighbors.
In the absence of external constraint the time evolution is controlled by a local adoption of a neighboring strategy, whose introduction is motivated by the Darwinian selection rule. When starting the simulations with a random initial state comprised of only cooperators and defectors, one finds that, in dϭ1,2, and 3 dimensions, the stationary state of the system is a pure defector one. However, if the T strategy is also present in the initial state, then the stationary state is dominated by mutual cooperation.
The external constraint, forcing the players to adopt strategy C with probability p, has the following consequences. If only C and D strategies are present in the initial state, then the external constraint enforces the cooperation for all value of p. However, if the three strategies C,D, and T are initially present and if the dimensionality of the system is larger than 1, then the external constraint reduces the cooperation maintained by T for small values of p. The cooperation will be enforced only if the constraint is large enough (pϾ p c1 ). These conclusions are reached both from an extended meanfield analysis and from MC simulations for two-and threedimensional systems. The general features are not affected by the value of b, characterizing the temptation to defect.
Our study confirms the crucial role of the T strategy which is able to prevent the spreading of defection. The T strategy, however, dies out in the one-dimensional system as well as in the models for which the simple mean-field theory is exact.
The above conclusions are in agreement with several historical facts coming from both political and economical worlds. For example, it shows that forcing a fraction of the population to cooperate in a naive way ͑the C strategy͒ does not improve the overall cooperation in the society. It is better to educate more individuals in such a way that they will be able to play the more sophisticated tit for tat strategy if one desires to improve cooperation. From a nonequilibrium phase transition point of view, the above investigations have confirmed that the two second order phase transitions associated with the extinction processes belong to the robust directed percolation universality class. Finally we emphasize that similar behaviors are expected for spatially extended Lotka-Volterra-like systems with three ͑or more͒ species, provided that one of the species is externally favored.
